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Résumé : Ce travail a un double objectif : expliquer certaines limites ayant
une inﬂuence sur les approches traditionnelles de la théorie de la réussite, et
souligner un critère pour l'évaluation comparative des succès empiriques de la
théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants : a) la supériorité de la prédiction
sur l'adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutées et c) l'utilisa-
tion limitée des hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à la
désambiguïsation du label  succès de la théorie , la deuxième section traite
de quelques-unes des principales lacunes du traditionnel, une approche consé-
quentialiste de la théorie de la réussite. Puis quelques éléments sont donnés
aﬁn de renforcer le critère de succès empirique de la théorie, souligné dans la
dernière section.
Abstract: The purpose of this work is twofold: to explain some of the lim-
itations aﬀecting traditional approaches to theory success, and to outline a
criterion for the comparative evaluation of a theory's empirical success. A
special emphasis will be placed on the following issues: a) the superiority of
prediction over accommodation, b) the resolution of non-refuting anomalies,
and c) the limited use of ad hoc hypotheses. After a ﬁrst section devoted to
the disambiguation of the label theory success, the second section discusses
some major shortcomings of traditional, consequentialist approaches to theory
success. Then some clues are provided so as to strengthen the criterion for a
theory's empirical success, which is outlined in the last section.
1 Preliminary remarks: the disambiguation
of theory success
The starting point of the paper is a distinction between four main, not mu-
tually exclusive kinds of theory success: 1) the one concerning a greater em-
pirical adequacy or ﬁt (oxygen theory versus phlogiston theory, relativistic
Philosophia Scientiæ, 19(1), 2015, 114.
2 María Caamaño-Alegre
mechanics versus Newtonian mechanics), 2) that due to an increase in pre-
dictive power, which clearly entails a rise in empirically promising infor-
mativeness (Relativity Theory [theory of relativity?] versus Newtonian me-
chanics), 3) that derived from a higher explanatory capacity accomplished in
terms of a more detailed speciﬁcation of those causal mechanisms underlying
the empirical phenomena under study (Mendelian genetics versus theory of
the mixture), 4) the one related to a higher explanatory capacity achieved
through a more systematized and uniﬁed account of empirical phenomena
(Newtonian mechanics versus Galilean Mechanics). Theory success of either
kind can be understood as a form of explanatory success (predictive, informa-
tive, causal, and unitary-systematic respectively), each of them having been
historically emphasized from diﬀerent philosophical standpoints (by authors
like K. Hempel, P. Kitcher, M. Friedman, and W. Salmon). This persistent
ambiguity surrounding the notions of explanation and success will be avoided
here by carefully specifying which side of explanation is being considered. As
already said, I am going to focus on the ﬁrst kind of theory success, which,
from the approach adopted here, presupposes also the second kind of success.
The above distinction, however, becomes more complicated once that
[delete?] we take into account the fact that either kind of theory success may
occur in a (conceptually) continuous or discontinuous fashion, depending on
whether the successor (more successful) theory is conceptually compatible (or
commensurable) with the predecessor (less successful) one. Challenges posed
by conceptual discontinuity will be minimized here by assuming T. S. Kuhn's
late notion of local incommensurability [Kuhn 1982, 1993], which allows for
empirical commensurability and rational comparison between rival theories.
The concepts shared or commonly presupposed by incommensurable theories
would provide a commensurable ground for theory evaluation.
Another point to clarify has to do with [is?] the possibility of distin-
guish[ing?] between success due to a theory and success merely accompanying
the theory, that is, taking place as the theory develops but not because of
the theory. Throughout this paper, the expression theory success will refer
to that success dependent on the theory under consideration, rather than to
that not dependent on such theory but just occurring simultaneously with its
development. The example of the caloric theory is often used to show how cer-
tain research components are preserved in science. This preservation has been
accounted diﬀerently depending on whether the adopted approach is realistic
or instrumentalist. Authors [like?] S. Psillos, P. Kitcher or J. Worrall, provide
a realistic account of the caloric case, claiming that much progress made by
the caloric theorists has been preserved by upholders of succeeding theories.
According to Psillos, the achievements made during the development of the
caloric theory, were the following: the development of calorimetry (speciﬁc
heat), the law of adiabatic expansion of gases, and Carnot's theory of heat en-
gines [Psillos 1994]. On the other hand, non-realists like L. Laudan or H. Chang
reply by objecting that what is preserved does not include theoretical compo-
nents but elements that are independent of the caloric theory. In emphasizing
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the independence of these research constituents, Chang stresses the relevance
of the following: observational data, phenomenological laws, non-empirical el-
ements like representational or inferential techniques (including mathematical
methods), and deeply rooted metaphysical commitments [Chang 2003, 910
911]. This metaphysical debate on preservation will not be resumed here, since
the present focus of discussion is rather the dependence or independency of
research achievements with respect to a given theory. Whatever view we hold
on this particular case, the interesting point to note here is the very possibil-
ity that not all achievements accomplished during the period when a theory is
developed are due to the very theory.
Finally, questions about whether theory success implies some sort of truth
approximation, or whether it provides grounds for a realist conception of sci-
entiﬁc theories, are going to be put aside. Since arguments in favour of these
ideas are supported on considerations concerning success of the above kinds,
clariﬁcation of the latter turns out important regardless of what view is hold
with respect to the former issues. This metaphysical neutrality extends here
over all realist and anti-realist options in the market, from entity realism (dif-
ferent versions of which are endorsed by Kitcher, Hacking, and Giere among
others) to structural realism (developed by authors like Worrall, Ladyman,
French), and anti-realism in its diﬀerent varieties and degrees (Laudan, van
Fraassen, Cartwright).
2 Limitations of traditional approaches to
theory success
As already pointed out, traditional criteria for theory success mainly revolved
around the number of a theory's successful applicationswhich, from the
statement view of theories [Popper 1962], amounts to the number of a theory's
true empirical consequences, and, from a model-theoretic approach [Moulines,
2000: missing in the reference list], to the number of phenomena successfully
embedded into theoretical models through those models' empirical substruc-
tures. In characterizing a theory (T2) as more successful than another theory
(T1), traditional accounts of theory success (S) have usually commit to [com-
mited?] the following, merely quantitative condition: S(T1) ⊂ S(T2), some-
times supplemented with the Kuhnian condition that S(T2) includes some of
T1's most recalcitrant anomalies.
However, this purely quantitative account of theory success, even if supple-
mented by [with?] the assumption that there is an inter-theoretical epistemic-
pragmatic criterion for prioritising certain intentional applications whose pos-
sible extension to models is of special interest, is not revealing enough as an
analysis of theory success. A major problem has to do with the fact that
the requirements placed on the success of the [delete?] competing theories
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are merely quantitative, and for this reason, insensitive both to the empir-
ical import of the intended applications covered by the theories and to the
explanatory signiﬁcance of the models accounting for the applications. With
respect to the ﬁrst, it is worth mentioning the special relevance given to novel,
unexpected predictions or to those concerning salient phenomena which were
not initially included in the domain of application of the theories. It seems
plausible to think that even if a theory fails to satisfy the condition mentioned
in [the?] last paragraph, it could still be considered as more successful than its
competitor in case that only the ﬁrst provided unexpected predictions and an
explanation for previously disregarded salient phenomena. Relativity theory
may illustrate this kind of success, since it was considered successful, at least
partly for these reasons, even before it could be conﬁrmed to the same extent
as Newtonian mechanics had been. There can also be cases (like Ptolemaic
and Copernican theories) in which rival theories do not diﬀer in their quantita-
tive success, and yet one of them is considered as explanatorily superior to the
other. The two conditions above are not applicable here, and yet there seems
to be a clear diﬀerence in success between the two theories. Before Galileo,
Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy could roughly account for the same phe-
nomena. However, the second was regarded as a better explanation, not only
due to its greater simplicity and unifying capacity, but also to its less ad hoc
character. A further problem aﬀecting the traditional standpoint concerns the
meagre attention paid to the scope, generality or informativeness of a theory
as an element of success. In other words, the quantitative requirement can be
met without the scope of the theory signiﬁcantly changing.
The above observations suggest that some important questions remain
unanswered in traditional accounts of theory success. These questions point
to the need for reﬁnements in the form of several qualitative requirements,
which should be specially focused on issues regarding a theory's scope and
possible adhocness [maybe it would be worth hamonizing the way you write
ad-hoc-ness?]. More in particular, such requirements will concern: a) the res-
olution of non-refuting anomalies [Laudan 2000, 166167] the superiority of
prediction over accommodation [Lipton 1991, 68], and c) the limited use of
non-corroborated auxiliary hypotheses [Thagard 1978, 8689]. Notice the es-
pecial relevance that all the above features have to the question of empirical
adequacy, and which becomes evident in the fact that a) is directly connected
to both empirical adequacy and informativeness; b) is related to informative-
ness and indirectly to empirical adequacy (possibility of increasing empirical
adequacy by increasing informativeness); and c) is indirectly related to the
empirical adequacy of a theory, since it is directly related to the empirical
adequacy to the theory's auxiliary hypotheses.
In order to provide an answer to these issues, a stronger notion of empirical
adequacy is sketched in the next section.
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3 Developing a stronger notion of empirical
adequacy
In dealing with the problem of theory success, traditional approaches face some
serious shortcomings, in particular those related to the neglect of the problems
regarding ad hoc-ness or the insuﬃcient attention paid to issues concerning
the application openness or incompleteness of a theory. A stronger notion of
empirical adequacy is needed in order to overcome these shortcomings. So
next we are going to take into account several hints provided by some of the
authors who most seriously attempted to show the signiﬁcance of the above
qualitative requirements. Let us ﬁrst pay attention to the issue concerning
non-refuting anomalies.
A) The notion of non-refuting anomaly is introduced by Laudan in Progress
and its Problems [Laudan 1977], where he characterizes anomalies in general
as empirical problems which raise reasonable doubts about the empirical ad-
equacy of a theory once another theory has solved them [Laudan 1977, 28,
30]. According to him, non-refuting anomalies, in contrast to refuting ones, do
not involve any logical incompatibility between empirical consequences of the
theory on the one hand and veriﬁed statements regarding empirical facts on
the other [Laudan 1977, 2729]. They rather entail a theory's incapability to
account for certain kind[s?] of salient empirical phenomena whose description
is consistent with everything established by the theory. As Laudan puts it:
Such non-refuting anomalies typically arise when one theory is
compatible with, but oﬀers no solution to (or explanation of),
certain phenomena for which some [of?] its rivals can give an
account. It was my claim that the scientiﬁc methodologies of
logical empiricism had not recognized this historically signiﬁcant
form of anomaly. [Laudan 1981, 618]
Non-refuting anomalies, therefore, do not primarily point to any mistake on
the way in which a theory explains the phenomena but rather to the incom-
pleteness on the part of the theory. Typical cases in which this happens are
the ones pointed out by Laudan when developing the notion of non-refuting
anomalies in arguing for the importance of completeness as a theoretical virtue.
In his work from [of?] 1977 he mentions two cases: the incapability of pre-
Galilean kinematics to explain the mathematical features of pendular motion,
i.e., the absence of predictions for the geometry of the moving weight, and
Newtonian mechanics' lack of explanation for the coplanarity and common
direction of the planets' orbits, which had been accommodated in Keplerian
and Cartesian astronomies [Laudan 1977, 29]. Some other examples are added
in his 2000 paper; for instance, the fact that continents ﬁt together, for which
stable-continent theories of geology oﬀered no explanation, or the phenomenon
of residual background radiation, which remained unexplained by steady state
cosmology [Laudan 1977, 167].
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Laudan's conception of anomalies, strongly inspired by Kuhn's [1962/1970,
52-65] [missing in the reference list],1 includes the idea that anomalies can
only be regarded so when another theory has been capable of solving them.2
Here a wider notion of anomaly is favored instead. According to this wider
characterization, anomalies (of either kind) consist in empirical problems that
raise rational doubts about the empirical credentials of a theory regardless of
whether another theory has succeeded in solving them.
We can already give an idea of what distinguishes non-refuting anomalies
from cases where some phenomena remain unexplained by a theory either
due to the fact that they fall outside its domain of application or because,
despite being included in the domain, it is foreseeable that the theory, as
it stands, will be able to account for them in the future. Unlike the ﬁrst
kind of case, non-refuting anomalies have close similarity or connection to
paradigmatic exemplars of a theory's intended applications; as opposed to
the second kind of case, these anomalies, because of their recalcitrant nature,
suggest that the theory will need substantial modiﬁcations, additions or even
a replacement. Against this, and favoring Laudan's view, it could be argued
that unless there is a contrast class of alternative theories capable of solving
certain non-refuting empirical problems, we do not have grounds for regarding
the latter as anomalies rather than just mere problems of adjustment between
theory and data, or, alternatively, mere empirical ﬁndings not targeted for
explanation (even if closely similar to paradigmatic exemplars). In reply to
the ﬁrst option, it must be emphasized that non-refuting anomalies point not to
those cases in which a theory speaks only very approximately but to those cases
where a theory, despite possible eﬀorts to the contrary, remains silent with
respect to certain phenomena. As for the second possibility, it is important to
note that anomalies consist in salient or striking phenomena that, given their
relevance to the theory, the latter should be able to accommodate.
Let us now turn to the most central and insightful aspect in such charac-
terization, i.e., the widening of the evidential or evaluative basis for a theory
to embrace veriﬁed empirical statements that are neither among the set of
the theory's consequences nor among the set of the theory's excluded conse-
1. It may be worthwhile to brieﬂy recall Kuhn's notion of anomaly, since some of
Laudan's points were already suggested by the former, who nevertheless failed to fully
realize about their consequences for the traditional conception of evidential support.
The general notion of anomaly introduced by Kuhn corresponds to those problems
or phenomena that a theory cannot accommodate and that do not ﬁt the theoretical
expectations [1962/1970, 58]. Both refuting and non-refuting anomalies fall under
the above general notion. Finally, Kuhn, as opposed to Laudan, does not regard it as
necessary for an anomaly to be recognized as such that some rival has been able to
solve it. On the contrary, he argues that it is the previous awareness of anomaly what
[that?] initiates the process of theory modiﬁcation or theory change [1962/1970, 62].
2. Cf. [Laudan 1977, 29, also n. 15]. Consequently, Laudan equates what has
been called Kuhn's losses [Kuhn, 1962/1970, 107-108] with certain instances of
non-refuting anomalies, namely, those in which the successor theory provides no ex-
planation for phenomena that the previous theory successfully covered.
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quences. To use Laudan's own terms, his discussion of non-refuting anomalies
entails the rejection of the consequentialist theory of evidence or plausibility
[Laudan 1995, 28], as well as the recognition that [...] being a consequence
of a hypothesis is neither necessary nor suﬃcient to qualify something as ev-
idence for that hypothesis [Laudan 1995, 29]. The warrant conditions of a
statement, therefore, should not be equated with its truth conditions, since
poor explanatory power would raise doubts about the epistemic virtue of a
theory regardless of whether the latter's truth conditions are widely satisﬁed
[Laudan 1995, 33].3
The empirical adequacy of a theory, then, does not only depend on the
latter's empirical consequences being true but also on them corresponding to
the most salient phenomena in its domain of application. In model-theoretic
terms: a theory's empirical adequacy does not only require that (in at least
one of its models) all its empirical substructures are isomorphic to the cor-
responding phenomena [van Fraassen 1976], but also that they are so to all
salient phenomena in the domain. The challenge, then, is to characterize the
kind of information that, even if logically disconnected from what a theory
entails, nonetheless provides crucial evidence for the theory and falls inside its
domain of application. From the examples chosen by Laudan, it seems that he
has in mind cases in which some striking empirical regularities remain theoret-
ically unexplained, even though they clearly fall within the theory's domain.
As we will see in section 4, the threefold evaluation of theories put forward by
Kuipers involves the consideration of what he calls neutral results [Kuipers
2005], which amount to Laudan's non-refuting anomalies and represent an
important parameter in the comparative assessment of theory success.
B) Let us now turn to the issue concerning the priority of prediction over
accommodation [Lipton 1991, 68], [Forster 2000, 233]. Intuitively, it seems
clear that the quality of the evidence provided by predictions is better than
that gathered through accommodation. At ﬁrst glance it appears that this
diﬀerence in the quality of evidence lays in the way a predictive theory is
devised and tested in contrast to how an accommodative theory would be
built and evaluated. In the ﬁrst case, an ad hoc conception of the theory
would be more diﬃcult, since the evaluation of the theory would depend on
what the theory establishes either about future events or about past events
3. In his 1988 paper, T. Nickles argues that the consequentialist model of scientiﬁc
justiﬁcation should be combined with Laudan's generative model, since the second
point to theoretical changes that fall outside the standard conditionalization, which
would depend on background knowledge remaining ﬁxed [Nickles 1988, 10]. Although
in a diﬀerent context such as the ﬁeld of mathematics, I. Lakatos introduced a notion
similar to Laudan's non-refuting anomalies, namely, that of heuristic falsiﬁers. He
explains that, unlike logical falsiﬁers, which show that a theory as such is false (incon-
sistent), heuristic falsiﬁers merely show that a theory does not explain properly what
it set out to explainit is a false theory of the informal domain in question. Still,
when Lakatos claimed that the crucial role of heuristic refutations is to shift prob-
lems to more important ones, to stimulate the development of theoretical frameworks
with more content [Lakatos, 1967/1978, 40], [Lakatos 1978].
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that, even if already known, were not initially targeted by the theory. An
accommodative theory, by contrast, could be built just to ﬁt events already
included in its initially targeted domain.
The above account of the diﬀerence between prediction and accommoda-
tion, however, is neither completely right nor very enlightening. It is not
completely right because it presents accommodation as merging into ad-hoc-
ness, when the former does not necessarily imply the latter. The Darwinian
theory of evolution, for instance, despite its [it?] being more accommodative
than predictive, is not regarded as an ad hoc theory. The intuitive account
of accommodation is not very enlightening neither, since, regardless of how a
theory was initially devised (in an ad hoc, accommodative or predictive man-
ner) it may turn out something diﬀerent in the future depending on diﬀerent
dynamical aspects concerning theory testing as well as theory evolution. As ar-
gued by Peter Lipton, lack of ad-hoc-ness and precision should be emphasized
as the most distinctive features of predictions as opposed to accommodations.
The implications of ad hoc-ness will be discussed in the following section. As
for precision, one of the main reasons why predictions are precise is that,
as opposed to accommodations, they can be subject to experimental control
[Lipton 1991, 169]. Anticipating unknown facts, on the other hand, even if
clearly constituting an advantage of predictions, does not represent one of its
most essential features. Not surprisingly the use of Einstein's special relativity
theory to predict the deviation of Mercury's perihelion is also mentioned as
an instance of a prediction providing stronger support than mere accommoda-
tion, despite the fact that such deviation was an already known phenomenon.
The soundness of background knowledge and auxiliary assumptions is also
mentioned as an indicator of non-ad-hoc-ness.
Put in a nutshell, as opposed to what happens with predictive theories, in
the case of accommodative theories, the domain of phenomena that prompted
the construction of a theory is not diﬀerent from the domain of phenomena
providing the evidential basis to test the theory. This suggests the success
condition that the evidential domain of a theory be diﬀerent from its con-
struction domain. This, in turn, would entail a higher independece of the
evidence with respect the theory for which it plays the evidential role, for the
evidence involved in testing the theory would not be part of the domain of
phenomena that the theory meant to explain.
C) Let us turn now to another condition for empirical adequacy such as
it is the limited use of ad hoc hypotheses, i.e., non-corroborated auxiliary
hypotheses. P. Thagard has established this condition as one of the simplicity
criteria for theory choice [Thagard 1978, 8689], yet in so far as the condition
essentially concerns corroboration it can also be understood as a condition to
further qualify the empirical adequacy of a theory. According to this author:
An auxiliary hypothesis is a statement, not part of the original
theory, which is assumed in order to help explain one element of
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F [the facts] or a small fraction of the elements of F . [Thagard
1978, 86, italics in the original]
Before this characterization, Thagard has already excluded the possibility that
A (i.e., a set of auxiliary hypotheses) be equated with C, that is, a set of un-
problematic conditions accepted independently of T or F and assumed in T 's
application. Instead, A would include assumptions with narrow applications,
restricted in use to one class of fact. As examples, he mentions Huygens'
assumption, in order to explain the irregular refraction in Iceland crystal, that
some waves are spheroidal rather than spherical, or his assumption that the
speed of light is slower in denser media to explain Snell's law of refraction.
Thagard points out that these assumptions sometimes coincide with ad hoc
hypotheses, although he notes that, since ad hoc-ness is a dynamic property,
auxiliary assumptions may lose this ad hoc status at some point. This may
occur either because they are at some point conﬁrmed or due to the fact that
competing theories share the same assumptions.
After severely scrutinizing most common accounts of ad hoc-ness, both
J. Leplin and M. Carrier have separately argued that none of such accounts
suﬃciently emphasizes the truly distinctive feature of ad hoc hypotheses. Both
agree that a hypothesis' ad hoc character is not determined by the way it was
devised but rather by the fact that it does not receive independent empirical
support. The two [both?] authors converge in pointing to excess empirical
content as a key requirement for non-ad-hoc-ness. In Carrier's terms:
A hypothesis explains a fact in a non-ad-hoc manner, if it simul-
taneously explains at least one additional independent fact that
either constitutes an anomaly for the rival theory or that falls be-
yond its realm of application, i.e., that is neither derivable from
nor inconsistent with the competing approach. [Carrier 1988, 206]
Although implying some further requirements, J. Leplin's deﬁnition of ad-
hoc-ness also includes a condition concerning the lack of independent empirical
support [Leplin 1975, 336337]. Yet, his most novel contribution to the analysis
of ad hoc-ness consists in a condition regarding non-fundamentality. This con-
dition reveals some important aspects related to ad hoc-nesslike the locally
holistic nature of anomalies and the corresponding requirement for hypothe-
ses to solve several anomalies together. The condition, however, also entails
some questionable points, specially the presupposition that non-fundamental
theories, i.e., those with a wide variety of serious insuﬃciencies, are the only
ones aﬀected by recalcitrant ad-hoc-ness. Given the dynamical nature of the-
ory justiﬁcation,which, as recognized by both Leplin and Carrier makes ad
hocness a dynamical, non-stable property, it may be equally possible that
a non-fundamental theory eventually overcomes its diﬃculties and becomes
a fundamental one. Thus, Leplin's distinction between incomplete theories
(where ad hoc hypotheses are eventually changed into non-ad-hoc ones) and
non-fundamental theories (where the above possibility is ruled out) does not
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turn out very helpful to elucidate the question of ad hoc-ness. On the one
hand, we can never be sure that an incomplete theory is not going to end up
revealing itself as non-fundamental and, conversely, a non-fundamental one
revealing as the opposite. That is the reason why, most often, unanimous
judgments about whether a theory is of one kind or the other are made only
when a theory has been actually completed or replaced, and yet unanimous
judgements about ad-hoc-ness can be made before that happens. Given its
questionable character, non-fundamentality is not included here as a neces-
sary condition for ad-hoc-ness. In other words, a general criterion of [for?]
ad hoc-ness should enable us to compare two theories in terms of their rela-
tive ad hoc-ness regardless of whether we regard either theory incomplete or
non-fundamental.
4 Outline of an empirical criterion for theory
success
The three qualitative requirements for theory success commented above have
all something in common: they imply some conditions concerning the relation
between a theory and diﬀerent subsets of its domain. So, before outlining an
empirical criterion for theory success that includes the above requirements, sev-
eral distinctions between diﬀerent sub-domains of a theory should be drawn.
There are two basic divisions: one between successful and unsuccessful in-
tended applications and the other between the construction domain and the
evaluative domain. The latter would include four sub-domains: two respec-
tively corresponding to refuting and non-refuting anomalies, on the one hand,
and two corresponding to successful prediction[s?] and accommodations, on
the other. For the sake of simplicity, let us introduce the following notational
conventions, all of them referring to domain speciﬁcations relative to a theory.
D = domain of application
C = construction domain
E = evaluative domain
ES = successful intended EU = unsuccessful intended
applications applications
EP = successful predictions ER = refuting anomalies
EA = successful accomodations EN = non-refuting anomalies
EAb = ad hoc accomodations.
The corresponding sub-domains of a theory are represented in the diagram
below. As indicated in the [missing word?] there, only in the case of ad hoc
hypotheses the construction domain and the evaluative domain of the theory
completely overlap.
The empirical criterion for theory success can now be outlined as follows:
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D(T)
EUES
EN
EAb
EA
EP ER
E=C
T2 is more empirically successful than T1 if the following conditions hold:
a) ES(T1) ⊆ ES(T2),
b) EN (T1) ∩ ES(T2) 6= ∅,
c) EA(T1) ∩ EP (T2) 6= ∅,
d) ||EAd(T2)|| < ||EAb(T1)||.
Note that these four conditions are here presented as globally suﬃcient for
comparative empirical success, but not as globally necessary, which would
reveal as too strong a requirement for most cases of theory choice. As shown
in the diagram, in cases of ad hoc accommodations the construction domain
and the evalutative domain completely overlap. Non-refuting anomalies of a
theory, on the othe hand, are always included within the sub-domain formed
by its unsuccessful intended applications.
This approach to theory success can be seen as supplementing Kuiper's
complex evaluation matrix by adding some qualitative requirements which are
absent from his proposal. In his symmetric models of separate hypothetico-
deductive method[s?] of evaluation, i.e., the micro- and the macro-models,
for a theory to be at least as successful as the old one, some general condi-
tions of adequacy must be satisﬁed not only for the deﬁnitions of success and
problem, but also for that of neutral resultwhich equates to the notion
of non-refuting anomaly. Contrary to what happened in the asymmetric mod-
els, where success conditions only refer explicitly to individual problems and
general successes while neutral results remain hidden, in the symmetric model
the latter play an important role [Kuipers 2005, 52]. By taking all three types
of results explicitly into account, Kuiper's symmetric models meet Laudan's
evaluative requirements concerning the wider scope of most successful theories.
Keeping in mind that neutral general facts for a theory constitute neither a
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problem nor a success, a successful theory should transform general problems
into neutral facts (or even successes) and neutral general facts into successes.
The same kind of requirement[s?] should be met at the micro-level for indi-
vidual successes, individual problems and neutral results. There also neutral
instances may remain neutral or become positive.
As pointed out earlier, the ﬁne-grained analysis developed by Kuipers
fails to incorporate some qualitative parameterslike ad hoc-ness and
accommodationwhich prove essential in the evaluation of theory success.
5 Concluding remarks
Traditional accounts of theory success have proven in a sense too broad and
in another too narrow. The ﬁrst point becomes evident in the neglect of
the problems regarding ad hoc-ness and accommodation, the second in the
insuﬃcient attention paid to issues concerning the application openness or
incompleteness of a theory. All these questions, however, seem crucial for a
comparative appraisal of theory success. Problems concerning accommoda-
tion and ad hoc-ness would require an analysis of a theory's level of precision
and excess empirical content with regard to its construction domain. Issues
regarding narrowness of scope would call for the recognition of non-refuting
anomalies as part of the evaluative domain of a theory. The above factors
should be taken into account if a theory's empirical success is to be evaluated
in all its complexity.
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